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Mr. Joseph Lelyveld
The New York Times Magazine
229 West 43rd Street
New York, New York 10036

Dear Mr. Lelyveld:

I should have learned a long time ago that when being interviewed by a journalist -- and you are one of the most able -- to turn on a tape recorder of my own. In the case of the two hours we spent together in which I gave you my complete and candid cooperation on 45 years of recollections about Bill Casey, that recording would have been invaluable. I will not now try to recapture what I said.

You quote me "correctly" twice. Yet both quotes, as you know, are fundamentally incorrect because they are extracted from a context which in one instance alters the meaning and in the other changes it totally.

I referred to Bill Casey in 1937 as a supporter of Franco. You specifically asked whether I thought that was a matter of religious conviction and I said "yes." But this fact was utterly irrelevant except as a prelude to my lengthy detailing of his extraordinary service and skill in assisting me in the preparation of the final industrial mobilization plans which, after all, had as their object the preparation of the United States for what Bill Casey and I both anticipated in 1938: war started by Adolf Hitler in Europe.

The roughly 45 minutes I estimate we spent on his becoming the nation's outstanding expert on priorities, allocations, other aspects of industrial mobilization was not reminiscence. Its purpose was to illustrate several things: (1) His unreserved antipathy to the Axis powers and their aggression; (2) his extraordinary intelligence ability to piece together the way governments function or would have to function under certain circumstances; (3) and in the context of your story, most important, his exceptional capability for the analytic aspect of intelligence.

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Finally, in speculating about the reason for General Donovan picking this young man out of the heap for the vital role he played in O.S.S., I said that the knowledge of his work on industrial mobilization rapidly developed considerable respect in the Washington community and undoubtedly came to both General Donovan's and David Bruce's attention.

Instead of this, we are left with the stark and unfriendly reference to an ultraconservative, Franco-supporting Casey. If I were he, I'd resent that comment of mine about him and quite correctly. And the major reason I am writing this letter is for him: It's to send him a copy so that he at least has a truncated sense of what I did talk about.

To go further on that "conservative" theme: I understand why even The New York Times Magazine requires juicy material. I'm astonished that you did not use one of the juiciest and least known stories of all, one which bears very directly on his extraordinary capacity for creative intelligence. I told you just one episode of many during his heavy O.S.S. responsibility in London, of his lifelong remarkable eagerness to assemble the best brains possible in order to solve a problem and gave you a list of names which included Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Walter Lord, Walt Rostow, and a small team of economists Rostow was part of. This was in the context of the urgent need to plan to prevent the bringing up of Nazi reinforcements immediately after the D-Day landings. The military, mostly British but also U.S., had their traditional ideas of what it is that should be bombed in order to impede supply. Casey conceived of the idea of using economic intelligence for a more unorthodox and very likely more accurate identification of those targets which would more effectively impede the movement of reinforcements. I also added that, to my knowledge, this was the first professional use of economic intelligence and the precursor of Casey's lifelong interest in that branch of intelligence. I added that it was in that field that he made a major contribution as a member of PFIAB and was quickly prepared for that aspect of his responsibility as DCI.

Now to the second of the quotations in which, once again, entirely accurately, you quoted me as saying that this was one job he would not likely become restless in. But that observation was immediately followed with a reference (not from me) to the shallow ego satisfaction he gets from signing his memos as DCI with the letter "C" in the tradition of the British "M." Gone entirely is what preceded that comment about his not becoming restless as DCI. Your notes will reveal that I had observed as a chronic characteristic of his that when he undertook any responsibility he invariably went to the heart of understanding what the fundamental challenge was in that post, and when he felt that he had solved or accomplished

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that challenge, was not content to simply carry a bureaucratic responsibility no matter how status laden and was eager to move on to another challenge. As illustrations, I cited his work at the SEC, at the Export-Import Bank, and I'm quite sure I did explain that the end of his work as Undersecretary for Economic Affairs at State did not fit that bill but was the product instead of a conflict between two strong and creative minds: the Secretary of State was Henry Kissinger and Casey was Undersecretary. I then added that the reason he would not be restless with the intelligence responsibility, in my opinion, was that intelligence presents challenges and problems that are never solved.

These and other things which I told you were in response to your conveying to me that you wanted to do a piece on Casey the man. I won't comment on the article as a whole except to repeat what I said earlier, that I have always had a particular respect for any story which carries your byline and, in addition, felt that we had spent a long and very satisfactory interval together.

I will close, however, by citing one aspect of your story in which you address yourself to the question of whether or not there has been an improvement in intelligence during Casey's period as DCI. You do not quote me in that context, but had you, the answer would have come out somewhat differently. You do make a reference to the increased number of estimates and analyses during the Casey period but add that quantity is no measure of quality. You do, in fairness, state that two Senators on the Intelligence Committee acknowledge some improvement but balance that judgment with skepticism voiced by "others with security clearances." I have all those clearances coupled with a responsibility to evaluate the very issue under question. You asked whether I could make any comment as a member of PFIAB on the quality of that work. I said that while I was extremely reticent to make any observations about the work that PFIAB does, I nevertheless felt free to say quite emphatically that in several of the most vital areas of analytic intelligence, there has been a marked improvement in the acuity of the analytic work.

With my deep regard and disappointment,

Sincerely,



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P.S. While this is a personal letter to you, with a copy to Bill Casey, I have not the slightest objection should The New York Times decide to print it.